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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of di¤erences in endogenous technological change
between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic
interaction in environmental policies. A country that initially has a dirty technology
(an environmentally lagging country) reduces more pollution emissions by impos-
ing a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission, although it may
generate larger total emissions. The more a country reduces pollutants, the more
it learns how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner at low cost. The
main nding is that an environmentally lagging countrys technology may continue
to advance through a learning-by-doing e¤ect until it exceeds the environmental
friendliness of a leading country that initially had the cleanest technology (i.e., en-
vironmental leapfrogging could occur). Whether a country eventually becomes an
environmentally leading country depends on the country size and its awareness of
environmental quality.
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1 Introduction
In order to control and limit climate change, long-term greenhouse gas emissions need to
be reduced.1 Given that alternative energy sources to fossil fuels, such as photovoltaic
and wind power, are currently available at high cost, technological progress will be a
key component of the long-term strategy to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions
without compromising economic growth.2 Although developed countries have been re-
sponsible for most of the greenhouse gas emissions historically, in the coming decades,
increasing emissions will be mainly caused by economic growth in developing countries
(IPCC, 2007; OECD, 2012). It is argued that by leapfrogging straight to clean produc-
tion paradigms, developing countries may be able to bypass the dirty stages of industrial
growth experienced in the past by todays developed countries (IPCC, 2007; World Bank,
2003). Existing empirical evidence indicates that environmental leapfrogging in develop-
ing countries is possible provided a number of basic conditions are met (e.g., absorptive
capacity, technology transfer, and environmental policy) and the key factors for success
are di¤erent in each case.3
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the basic mechanism of the development and
adoption of new clean technologies in the long-run in a two-country framework. In par-
ticular, we focus on how environmental leapfrogging occurs and a¤ects global pollution
emissions. Each countrys environmental policy plays a critical role in technological
change. Adoption of clean technologies induced by environmental policy in one country
may reduce the other countrys incentive for strict environmental policy that leads to
development of new clean technologies. In other words, strategic interaction between
countries might hamper long-term technological progress, which has a negative impact
on the environment. Therefore, it is quite important to elucidate how endogenous tech-
nological change is a¤ected by strategic environmental regulations and how di¤erences
in environmental technologies between countries a¤ect global emissions. However, to our
knowledge, there exist no theoretical models rigorously dealing with endogenous techno-
logical change under the presence of international strategic interaction.
We present a simple two-country model to consider the di¤erence in countries re-
sponse in terms of adoption of new clean technologies to environmental policies. A unique
nal good generates transboundary pollution (greenhouse gas) as a by-product of pro-
duction. In order to mitigate pollution damage, the national government requires each
domestic rm to reduce its emissions. We identify and interpret the fundamental forces
for technological progress in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game.
Our model highlights the impact of environmental regulations on endogenous tech-
nological change in the long run. In doing this, we follow the standard literature on
1According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012), without
new policies, by 2050, global greenhouse gas emissions will increase by more than 50% compared with
the 2010 emissions, primarily due to a 70% growth in energy-related CO2 emissions. As a result, the
average global temperature is projected to be 3-C to 6-C higher than preindustrial levels by the end of
the century, which exceeds the globally agreed goal of limiting it to 2-C to prevent disruptive climate
change. See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014).
2See, e.g., IPCC (2011) on renewable energy sources.
3See, for instance, Dasgupta et al. (2002) and Walz (2010) on a downward shift of the environmental
Kuznets curve (EKC), Gallagher (2006) on energy-technology leapfrogging in the Chinese automobile
industry, Huber (2008) who reviews the global di¤usion of environmental innovations, Perkins (2003)
who reviews environmental leapfrogging in developing countries, Watson and Sauter (2011) who review
case studies of leapfrogging (e.g., the Korean steel industry, the Indian and Chinese wind industries, and
bioethanol production in Brazil).
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international trade and leapfrogging (Brezis et al., 1993) by casting learning by doing as
the engine of technological progress. As long as a country reduces pollutants, it learns
how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner at low cost. Learning-by-doing
determines whether a country has cleaner technologies than another country in the long
run. This learning process is supported by existing empirical evidence that an increase in
energy prices and environmental regulations not only reduces greenhouse gas emissions
by shifting behavior away from polluting activities, but also encourages environmentally
friendly innovation, which makes pollution control less costly in the long run (Newell et
al., 1999; Popp, 2002).
The main result of this paper is to demonstrate that environmental leapfrogging may
occur under plausible conditions. As each country is assumed to regulate its emissions to
maximize individual welfare, a country that initially has a dirty technology (an environ-
mentally lagging country) needs to reduce more pollution emissions. The environmentally
lagging country tends to impose a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emis-
sion and reduce more pollution emissions, although it may generate a large amount of
pollution emissions (i.e., implementing a weak environmental regulation in terms of emis-
sions per unit of the good). This is realized as a result of international strategic interaction
emerging in Nash equilibrium of the policy game. Consequently, learning-by-doing e¤ects
are large in the lagging country and its technology becomes environmentally friendly more
rapidly than the other country that initially had a clean technology (an environmentally
leading country). Thus, the lagging countrys environmental friendliness could continue
to increase until it exceeds the leading countrys environmental friendliness. Each coun-
trys friendliness converges to a certain level in the long run because the government
ceases to implement environmental regulations when its technology is su¢ ciently clean.
We can show that whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading
country depends on country size and awareness of environmental quality.
This theoretical result seems consistent with empirical observations. According to the
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Indicators of the United Nations, many countries,
including developed and emerging economies, have reduced the amount of carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted by purchasing power
parity (PPP), for which what we call environmental friendlinessin this paper can be a
reasonable proxy variable as discussed later. We observe that in some cases, the pace of
reduction is higher in a dirtiercountry (i.e., a country generating more CO2 emissions
per unit of GDP); see Section 4.2 for more details in the data. More importantly, we
even see a reversal of the amount of per-GDP CO2 emissions between two particular
countries (e.g., Japan and Germany; China and Russia). This implies that leadership
in environmental friendliness (measured by per-GDP CO2 emissions) could uctuate
between countries. All these may indicate that our theoretical prediction is in line with
the real-world observation.
Our nding contributes to the international economics literature on leapfrogging. Af-
ter Brezis et al. (1993) found the fundamental mechanism through which leapfrogging
occurs in a simple Ricardian trade model with learning, various papers followed and
identied the driving forces of leapfrogging, which include comparative (dis)advantage,
international capital ows, and knowledge spillovers (Ohyama and Jones, 1995; Motta et
al., 1997; Brezis and Tsiddon, 1998; van de Klundert and Smulders, 2001; Desmet, 2002;
Furukawa, 2013).4 The present paper contributes to this literature by developing a new
4See Giovannetti (2001) for perpetual leapfrogging in a context of price competition between rms. In
addition, some literature in the eld of economic geography addresses both the theory and the empirical
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two-country model where leapfrogging in environmental leadership takes place endoge-
nously, while those existing papers do not focus on environmental factors such as pollution
emissions. Our paper is also new to the literature in nding a policy-based mechanism of
leapfrogging. We demonstrate that environmental leapfrogging may result from a policy
game between governments with strategic interactions in global emissions. In this sense,
the leapfrogging in our model is not only a technology-driven phenomenon, but also a
policy-driven phenomenon. In the existing literature, such policy-driven leapfrogging is
not addressed.
In our model, technological change caused by international strategic interaction af-
fects global pollution dynamics. We also demonstrate that global pollution emissions
may either decrease or increase over time despite the fact that environmental technology
monotonically advances in both countries. More specically, the amount of global pollu-
tion emissions converges to a constant level in the long run, which may be lower (higher)
than the initial level of global emissions (i.e., the level in an early stage of adjustment
under dirty technologies) when environmental leapfrogging takes place (does not take
place) in equilibrium. In our model, the technology in the lagging country advances more
rapidly than that in the leading country. This feature implies that technologies in the two
countries advance considerably if both countries experience a state of environmental lag-
ging for many periods. That is, both countries possess similarly clean technologies when
leapfrogging occurs more frequently. This is why the long-term level of global pollution
can become low in the presence of leapfrogging.
Our results suggest the importance of balanced technological change. Most of the
worlds research and development (R&D) for environmental innovation occurs in high-
income countries (e.g., Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011) did nd
climate-friendly innovations in emerging Economies, but these innovations are limited.
While international transfers of climate-mitigation technologies occur mostly between
developed countries, technology transfers from developed countries to emerging countries
are few in number, but have been rising rapidly in recent years.5 We need to accelerate
international transfers to mitigate the imbalanced technological change between countries
that could cause undesirable e¤ects on the environment.
This paper is related to the literature on the interactions between environmental
regulations and endogenous technological change through R&D and learning-by-doing.
Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) examined the link between tighter environmental policy
and economic growth when the environmental R&D sector endogenously develops abate-
ment technologies. Goulder and Mathai (2000) explored policy-induced technological
change for the design of carbon-abatement policies when the channels of technological
progress are based on R&D and learning-by-doing. Acemoglu et al. (2012) considered
whether research can be directed to improving the productivity of clean and dirty inter-
mediate goods sectors and showed that sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with
temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production when the inputs are su¢ ciently
substitutable. Bosetti et al. (2008) and Fischer and Newell (2008) empirically assessed
the e¤ects of technological progress through learning, R&D, and knowledge spillovers.
None of these studies developed a two-country model to study the strategic interaction
of environmental policies between countries and the role of environmental leapfrogging.
Our contribution is to clarify the interaction of endogenous technological change between
evidence of technological leapfrogging at regional level; see, for example, Quah (1996a, b).
5Popp (2012) provided a comprehensive review of the literature on environmentally friendly techno-
logical change and technology transfers.
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countries.6
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model of
endogenous technological change. Section 3 considers a Nash equilibrium of the policy
game. Section 4 explores a key mechanism underlying environmental leapfrogging. Sec-
tion 5 investigates the impact of leapfrogging on global pollution emissions and Section
6 concludes the article.
2 Basic Model
Time is discrete extending from t = 0 to1: There are two countries, labeled by i = A; B:
In the basic model, we keep the two countries as symmetric as possible. They di¤er only
in initial environmental technological levels.7 There is a single consumption good, which
is taken as the numeraire. The consumption good is produced by perfectly competitive
rms in both countries. There are constant returns to scale, and the technology converts
one unit of (e¤ective) labor into one unit of a good. The (gross) marginal cost in country
i is thus equal to the wage rate, denoted as wi(t):
Industrial production emits pollution, which is treated as a global pure public bad.
Assume that producing one unit of a good in country i generates i(t) > 0 units of
pollution. The variable i(t) captures how harmful the production technology in country
i is to the environment. We model a countrys environmental technology by using i(t),
which may correspond to the amount of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP adjusted by
PPP in a commonly-used data set of the United Nations (the MDG Indicators), given
that we think of a single-good model.
In this paper, we use two di¤erent words concerning the environment. The rst word
is awareness,to which we relate parameter ": This captures how uncomfortable people
feel about global pollutants. The second word is friendliness,inversely relating to i(t):
This captures to what extent the production technology of a country generates pollution
emissions.
In this study, we highlight the governments role in controlling emissions. In order to
control the aggregate emission level, the national government of country i requires each
domestic rm to reduce its pollution by 100  i(t) %: In other words, rms in country i
are allowed to generate i(t)(1   i(t)) of emissions for one unit of the good. We assume
that every rm can reduce one unit of emission by hiring one unit of (e¤ective) labor.
The e¤ective marginal cost for a rm to produce a unit of a good (with the inclusion of
pollution reduction) is equal to wi(t)(1 + i(t) i(t)): We may refer to  i(t) 2 [0; 1] as the
rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission in country i:
In each country, there is a representative consumer who inelastically supplies L=2
units of (e¤ective) labor. The consumer in country i consumes Ci(t) units of the single
consumption good and is endowed with the following utility function:
ui(t) = Ci(t)  " (EA(t) + EB(t))2 ; (1)
where Ei(t) is the ow of pollution emission generated by country i and " > 0 denotes
the degree of environmental awareness.
6In the literature on trade and the environment, the interaction of environmental policy interventions
is investigated using a two-country model, but technologies are exogenously given to focus on the e¤ects
of trade liberalization. See, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (2004).
7In Section 4.3, we will investigate the roles of heterogeneity between the countries.
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We treat pollution as a ow although most environmental problems are stock ones.
The reason is as follows. First, if the depreciation rate of the pollution stock is high (e.g.,
the natural rate of removal of atmospheric pollution is high), the ow assumption may
be a reasonable approximation (e.g., Schou, 2002; Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007).
Second, it simplies the analysis without altering the main insight of our paper.
3 Short-run Equilibrium
In this section, we will characterize the short-run equilibrium of our model under given
environmental technologies. Although our model is very simple, its equilibrium behavior
appears to be complex. To explain this, rst, we will see the consumers and rms
optimal activities in market equilibrium. Then, we will characterize the governments
optimal environmental policy in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game played by the two
countries.
3.1 Market Equilibrium
Assuming that rms of the two countries supply their products to the integrated world
market, the e¤ective marginal costs must be equated between the two countries. Thus
we have wA(t) (1 + A(t)A(t)) = wB(t) (1 + B(t)B(t)) = 1: The equilibrium wages are
obtained as
wi(t) =
1
1 + i(t) i(t)
: (2)
The labor market equilibrium conditions determine the equilibrium levels of national
output equal to
Yi(t) =
L=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
: (3)
We thus obtain the indirect utility function as
ui(t) =
L=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
  "
0@ X
i2fA;Bg
Ei(t)
1A2 ; (4)
where the pollution is given by
Ei(t) = (1   i(t)) Li(t)=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
(5)
for i = A and B:
3.2 Optimal Policy Equilibrium
The government in each country, say i; controls their pollution reduction rate  i(t) as an
environmental policy tool so as to maximize utility, given their foreign policy  j(t): A
reaction function is dened as  i (t; 

j(t)) = argmax i(t)2[0;1] ui(t): Solving this nonlinear
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optimization problem with (4) derives the reaction function as
 i (t; 

j(t)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "L  1
1+i(t)

i(t) +
j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
 1
ei(t) otherwise
1 if "L  1
1+i(t)

j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
 1 ; (6)
where
ei(t) =
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"L

"L+

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"L
 : (7)
Equation (6) suggests a possibility of so-called carbon leakage. Since  i (t; 

j(t)) is
globally a decreasing function in  j(t); one country would prefer a lower rate of pollution
reduction when the other country takes a higher pollution reduction rate. Thus, it is less
likely for both countries to take a very high rate of reduction at the same time. At the
aggregate level, this would imply the possibility of carbon leakage.
Next let us think of a Nash equilibrium in the policy game played between the two
governments. Denote as ( A(t); 

B(t)) a pair of strategies taken in the Nash equilibrium.
This equilibrium pair of policies can be calculated as a solution to the system consisting of
the two optimal policy equations:  A(t) = 

A(t; 

B(t)) and 

B(t) = 

B(t; 

A(t)): To derive
the equilibrium policies, rst, it is useful to note two basic facts. First, ( A(t); 

B(t)) =
(1; 1) and ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (eA(t); eB(t)) cannot be Nash equilibria.
8 Second, if the world
pollution level A(t)+B(t) is su¢ ciently low, both countries do not adopt any pollution
reduction policy:
( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) if A(t) + B(t) < min
i2fA;Bg

1
"L (1 + i(t))

: (8)
By using (6) and (7), we can easily obtain the equilibrium pair of the policy in the
following; see Appendix A for detailed derivations. Dene ^ such that ^ = 1=("L (1 + ^)).
With i 6= j; the policy pair is characterized by
( i (t); 

j(t)) =
8>>><>>>:
(pi(t); 0) if
min
n
i(t);
1
"L(1+i(t))
o
> j(t)  1"L(1+i(t))   i(t)
(1; 0) if ^ > j(t) > 1"L(1+i(t))
(1; qj(t)) if i(t) > j(t)  ^
; (9)
where we dene two functions in t; pi(t) and qj(t); that satisfy 0 < qi(t) < pj(t) < 1:
Formal denitions of these two functions are
pi(t) 
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
 "Lj(t)

"L+

1
1+i(t)
 "Lj(t)
 and qj(t)  "L 
1
j(t)
1
1+j(t)
"L+ 1
1+j(t)
: (10)
By using (8) and (9) with (10), Figure 1 relates the environmental technologies of both
countries, (A(t); B(t)); to their equilibrium pollution reduction rates, ( A(t); 

B(t)); in
8The proof is as follows. Substituting ej(t) into ei(t) results in
i (t)
i(t)
+ 1

i(t)
2"(1+i(t))
  j(t)2"(1+j(t))

= 0: This does not hold in general because i (t) > 0:
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(8) and (9). These complex equations and gures simply imply that the country that
has a dirtier technology (larger i(t)) is more willing to impose a higher rate of pollution
reduction per unit of the emission (larger  i(t)). We can formally prove our main result.
Theorem 1 A country with a less environmentally friendly technology tends to imple-
ment a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission generated in the country
in equilibrium;  i (t)   j(t) if i(t) > j(t):
Theorem 1 implies that the government of a country with dirtier technologies would
prefer to reduce more pollutants in percentage terms. This results from international
strategic interactions emerging in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game. This will deliver
the results on environmental leapfrogging and global pollution dynamics as shown in the
next two sections.
One may think that the implication of Theorem 1 seems inconsistent with recent
empirical literature showing that new technologies lower the cost of regulation and in-
crease the willingness to regulate (e.g., Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010; Lovely and Popp,
2011). However, we believe that these two seemingly opposite views are not necessarily
inconsistent but just seeing two di¤erent aspects of environmental technology. On the
one hand, the empirical literature focuses on a cost reduction of environmental regulation
driven by new technologies, which encourages the willingness to regulate as shown. On
the other hand, we are currently seeing new technologies to reduce the potential amount
of pollution emissions, which can be expressed by a decrease in i(t): The reduction of po-
tential pollution directly decreases the need to regulate itself, which would subsequently
weaken the willingness for a country to regulate pollution emissions. Our model captures
this aspect of environmental technology, which is essentially consistent with the way the
empirical literature considers.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the amount of pollution emissions per unit of
the good within a country, i, i.e., i(t) (1   i (t)) ; can be greater when the technology
of country i is dirtier (less environmentally friendly), i.e., i(t) is higher, although it is
accompanied by a higher reduction rate  i (t) per unit of the emission. This suggests
that, in our model, a country with a less environmentally friendly technology tends to
implement a weaker environmental regulation in terms of emissions per unit of the good,
which is consistent with the empirical literature mentioned above.
4 Technological Leadership in the Environment
In this section, we will introduce an endogenous process through which the environmental
technology in either country advances. We will demonstrate that the environmental
technological progress in either country interacts with each other to result in international
cycles in environmental technological leadership.
We provide a formal denition of environmental technological leadership and leapfrog-
ging. To begin with, we dene environmental technological leadership as the state whereby
a given country has the most environmentally friendly technology among all countries.
Thus, we refer to a country that has a lower i(t) as an environmentally leading country.
A country with a higher i(t) is called an environmentally lagging country. We may say
that environmental leapfroggingoccurs if environmental leadership shifts between the
8
countries, i.e., if i(t) < j(t) changes to i(t + 1) > j(t + 1) with i 6= j: Without loss
of generality, we assume A(0) < B(0) holds in period 0 (initial period). Country A is
initially an environmentally leading country.
4.1 Learning by Doing and Technological Progress
We follow the trade literature on leapfrogging (Brezis et al., 1993) by regarding learning
by doing as a source of technological progress. Specically, we incorporate endogenous
environmental technological progress into the model by considering a learning-by-doing
e¤ect; see Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002) for empirical evidence. In doing this, we
assume the simple setting à la Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986);9 however, if we thought
of a more general and realistic setting as in Youngs (1991) bounded learning by doing
model, our main result would not change qualitatively. We believe that using such a
simple setting is benecial for us to elaborate our main story: an environmentally lagging
country may be able to accumulate experience on environmentally friendly activities faster
than a leading country. As we will demonstrate below, this is because the lagging country
sets a higher rate of pollution reduction in equilibrium (Theorem 1). This implies that
the lagging country reduces more pollution emissions in equilibrium, although it may
generate more emissions (i.e., implementing a weaker environmental regulation in terms
of emissions per unit of the good).
Our basic assumption is that a country that reduces more pollutants learns how to
produce in a more environmentally friendly manner. Specically, we suppose that the
pollution level of a technology in country i in period t+1; i(t+1); is determined by the
cumulative stock of past experiences on reducing pollutants:
i(t+ 1) = i  
tX
s=0
( i (s)i(s)Yi(s)); (11)
where  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) is the pollution reduction made by country i in period s and 
is a learning-by-doing function that maps the pollution reduction country i does in a
period, s; to how much country i will learn to produce environmentally friendly from
its experience on reducing pollutants. i denotes an initial (period 0) pollution level in
country i, which is exogenously given. We put two natural assumptions on the learning-
by-doing function . (a) (0) = 0; there is no advance in a country if there is no reduction.
(b) (z0) > (z) for z0 > z for any z; z0 > 0; a country that reduces more pollutants
learns more on how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner. It can be easily
veried that, in equilibrium,  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) monotonically increases with 

i (s), which
plays a key role in showing the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium dynamics of the international environmental friendliness (A(t); B(t))
have seven di¤erent phases as shown in Figure 2.10
9See also Furukawa (2007) for learning by doing in an innovation-based growth model, which is
considered in much the same fashion as Arrows original paper.
10In Figure 2, A(t) (B(t)) is measured along the horizontal (vertical) axis, and the time index t is
omitted for simplicity.
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Proof. For the sake of explanation, by (11), we can derive the following expression in
terms of a ow:
i(t+ 1)  i(t) =  ( i (t)i(t)Yi(t)): (12)
Together with Figure 1, (12) implies that there are three typical patterns of the direction
in which (A(t); B(t)) moves over time, depending on the international pair of pollution
reduction rates ( A(t); 

B(t)):
First, in the region of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0), there are no technological advances by
assumption (a). Namely, since both countries do not engage in the pollution-reducing
activity, they do not learn anymore. Here (A(t); B(t)) never moves and is stable. Sec-
ond, in the regions of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (pA; 0) and (1; 0) ((

A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; pB) and
(0; 1)), only country A (B) engages in the abatement activity. Therefore, only A(t)
(B(t)) decreases over time by assumption (a). This fact is indicated by the left ar-
row (down arrow) within those regions. Third, in the region of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (1; qB)
(( A(t); 

B(t)) = (qA; 1)), both countries make the environmental investment. As the
pollution reduction rate in country A (B) is higher, i.e.,  A(t) > 

B(t) (

A(t) < 

B(t)),
the pollution level in country A (B), i.e., A(t) (B(t)), decreases more sharply than the
pollution level in country B (A), i.e., B(t) (A(t)) through learning by doing. This comes
from the assumption (b) and the equilibrium property that  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) monotonically
increases with  i (s): This is indicated by the long left arrow and the shorter down arrow
for the region of (1; qB) and the long down arrow and the shorter left arrow for the region
of (qA; 1). All seven phases are characterized, proving the lemma.
By means of the phase diagram in Figure 2, we can determine the direction in which
international environmental friendliness, (A(t); B(t)); advances over time and roughly
trace a dynamic path for any initial point. A typical trajectory, starting from point K0;
is illustrated by dotted arrows in Figure 2.
4.2 Environmental Leapfrogging
Take an example path starting from K0 in Figure 2, in which A(0) < B(0): Along an
equilibrium path from K0; as can be shown by using the phase diagram, environmental
leadership may shift between the two countries. At rst, country A is the leader with
lower A(t) and it retains its environmental leadership in the subsequent periods 1   4:
Along the equilibrium path, leapfrogging occurs in period 5; country B becomes a new
environmental leader.
We can formally identify this possibility of environmental leapfrogging. Recall that
by (9) and Figure 1, the equilibrium environmental policy pair is ( A(0); 

B(0)) =
(0; 0); (0; pB(0)) ; (0; 1); or (qA(0); 1): Dene a new threshold value ~ such that 2~ =
1=("L (1 + ~)): See Figure 3. If an initial point exists in the blue region in Figure 3 (a),
like point k0; the environmental friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) will eventually fall below
the 45 degree line. The blue region is characterized by
B(0) > A(0) 2 (~; ^): (13)
See Figure 3 (b), in which the red region corresponds to
B(0) > A(0)  ^: (14)
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If the pair (A(t); B(t)) exists such as k00 in the red region in Figure 3 (b), it may
eventually either fall below the 45 degree line or move to the blue region of (13). This is
guaranteed by assuming that the extent of technological progress that takes place within
a period is not too large, i.e., there exists some  > 0 such that (; t) < .11 Given this
assumption, if (14) holds, we can show that environmental leadership will eventually shift
internationally.
Taking into account (13) and (14) with Theorem 1, we have the following.
Proposition 1 (Environmental Leapfrogging) The environmental leadership of a coun-
try may be temporary. Suppose A(0) < B(0): If the extent of technological progress
taking place within a period is not too large, so long as
A(0) > ~; (15)
the environmental leadership initially retained by country A will eventually shift to the
initial lagging country B; environmental leapfrogging takes place.
To explain why leapfrogging can take place under (15), let us review our result on
a step-by-step basis. Initially, country A is an environmentally leading country with
A(0) < B(0): As the environmentally lagging country B is more polluting, it requires
domestic rms to reduce pollutants more by setting a higher rate of pollution reduction,
i.e.,  B(0) > 

A(0) (Theorem 1).
12 Through the learning-by-doing process, the lagging
country Bs technology thus becomes environmentally friendly more rapidly than the
leading country As technology does. If the technology of the leading country A were
initially environmentally friendly enough to satisfy A(0) < ~, the world economy would
get to the equilibrium without any pollution reduction ( i (t) = 0). However, as the lead-
ing country As technology is initially not very environmentally friendly (A(0) > ~), the
lagging countrys friendliness continues to increase until it exceeds the leading countrys.
Therefore, if (15) holds, the environmental leadership eventually shifts internationally.
In a nutshell, the environmentally lagging country may learn to produce in an environ-
mentally friendly way faster than the leading country since the lagging country reduces
more pollution emissions by setting a higher pollution reduction rate, which enhances
learning by doing. This creates a possibility of environmental leapfrogging in our model.
What happens after the rst environmental leapfrogging takes place? The answer
to this question is that a second leapfrogging may follow the rst. See Figure 2, in
which K5 moves horizontally in the subsequent period 6. Imagine that K5 crosses the
45 degree line, so the technological leadership shifts internationally again in period 6:
However, in the long run, leapfrogging necessarily ceases to exist because the world econ-
omys friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) eventually converges to the grey region in Figure
2, in which ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) and (A(t); B(t)) stays constant. Denote by (

A; 

B)
the point that (A(t); B(t)) nally reaches in the grey region. Whether A > 

B or
A < 

B is not determinate, depending in a complex fashion on the initial friendliness
levels (A(0); B(0)): That is, which country ultimately becomes an environmentally lead-
ing country is indeterminate. This indeterminacy essentially comes from the symmetry
11If a step of technological progress was very large, (A(t); B(t)) might immediately jump into the
grey region of (0; 0); in which case leapfrogging never takes place.
12Recall that this does not necessarily imply the lagging country B taking a stricter environmental
regulation because it can generate a larger amount of pollution emissions.
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between the countries (which di¤er only in i(t)). In any case, our message here is
that the environmental leadership retained by a country at some point of time might be
intrinsically impermanent.
Our theoretical result is consistent with empirical observations. A transition of the
key variable in our model, i(t), which indicates the amount of emissions form pro-
ducing one unit of a good (environmental friendliness of technology) in country i, may
correspond to that of CO2 emissions per 1 US dollar (USD) GDP adjusted by PPP, pro-
vided that composition of economic activity is constant in the country. According to the
MDG Indicators of the United Nations, many countries including developed and emerg-
ing economies reduced their CO2 emissions per 1 USD GDP (PPP) since the 1990s.13
For instance, emissions per 1 USD GDP in 1991 were 0.430kg in Germany and 0.325kg
in Japan but those in 2010 were 0.272kg in Germany and 0.297kg in Japan.14 Emissions
per 1 USD GDP in Poland were 1.176kg in 1990 and 0.479kg in 2010, while those in
Bulgaria were 1.155kg in 1990 and 0.515kg in 2010. Emissions per 1 USD GDP in 1992
were 1.730kg in China and 1.408kg in Russia, while those in 2000 were 1.011kg in China
and 1.237kg in Russia. The values are reversed again between them because in 2010,
they were 0.908kg in China and 0.863kg in Russia. Thus, our result could explain that
a country with initially high emissions per 1 USD GDP (PPP) reduces the emissions
signicantly compared with other countries with initially low emissions per 1 USD GDP
(PPP), thereby causing environmental leapfrogging regarding emissions per 1 USD GDP
(PPP).
4.3 Which Country Prevails? The Role of Country Heterogene-
ity
So long as countries are essentially identical, in the analysis above, which country prevails
is not determined. A fundamental question arises as to which country becomes the
ultimate environmental leader in the long run. In this subsection, we will give an answer
to this question by allowing for country heterogeneity.
Suppose that one country is relatively aware of environmental quality, say country
A; and the other has a large amount of e¤ective labor (i.e., population times their labor
productivity), say country B: Denote as Li and "i the e¤ective labor and environmental
awareness of country i, where i = A, B: Then, "A  "B and LA  LB: Equilibrium
optimal policies are shown in Figure 4. (See Appendix B for mathematical details.)
Figure 4 (a), by setting "A = "B and LA < LB; shows how the di¤erence in in-
ternational e¤ective labor sizes a¤ects the equilibrium policies. Dene ^i such that
^i = 1=("iLi (1 + ^i)): Because ^B is lower than ^A in this case, the stable region (0; 0)
is twisted with a rightward bias. In fact, as LB increases, ^B decreases and ^A increases.
Therefore, when country Bs e¤ective labor LB is very large, A > B (where coun-
try B is the leader) holds almost everywhere in the stable region (0; 0): Given that the
world economy eventually moves into the stable region (0; 0), we can say that a county
with large e¤ective labor is more likely to eventually obtain the environmental leadership
(A > B).
Remark 1 A country that has a large amount of e¤ective labor tends to eventually be-
come an environmental leader in the long run.
13See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=788.
14In the United Kingdom, emissions per 1 USD GDP were 0.443kg in 1991 and 0.242kg in 2010.
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The implication of Remark 1 is as follows. A large amount of e¤ective labor im-
plies huge potential pollution emissions. Thus, the government of country B tends to
implement a higher rate of pollution reduction for a longer time that promotes the tech-
nological progress as a by-product in the long-term. Therefore, given its large e¤ective
labor, country B may tend to obtain environmental leadership eventually, even if it is
initially an environmentally lagging country.
Heterogeneity of environmental awareness, "A > "B; determines which country nally
retains the environmental leadership. See Figure 4 (b), with the denition of  where
2(1+)  1="A; which means  = ("A) with 0("A) < 0: Starting from any point in the
red-box region (where B(t) <  and B(t) < A(t)); B(t) < A(t) holds in the long run.
Outside the red-box region, any path eventually converges to a state with B(t) > A(t);
where country A is the leading country. As, by 0("A) < 0; the red-box region becomes
smaller as "A increases, we have the following statement.
Remark 2 A country that has greater awareness of environmental quality tends to be-
come an environmental leader in the long run.
The implication of Remark 2 is straightforward. Given its greater environmental
awareness "A; country A is more likely to adopt a higher pollution reduction rate, abating
more emissions. It follows that the learning-by-doing e¤ect works more actively in country
A, which would advance environmental technology in country A faster (decreasing A(t)
faster than B(t)).
5 Global Pollution Dynamics
How does environmental leapfrogging a¤ect global pollution dynamics? To answer this
question, we assume that the two countries di¤er only in their technological friendliness;
A(t) < B(t). Using (5), (9), and (10), we will elaborate how global pollution, E(t) =
EA(t) + EB(t); changes over time in each stage of environmental development.
Stage I: Consider an earlier stage of environmental technology development, in which
both countries set a positive rate of pollution reduction, ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (qA(t); 1) : As
shown in the phase diagram in Figure 2, environmental technology advances in both
countries; both A(t) and B(t) decreases over time. By (5), (9), and (10), we have
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + A(t))
 e1A(t) as 1"L(1+A(t)) < A(t) : (16)
We nd that, during this early stage (stage I), global pollution increases as environmental
technologies in the leading country advance. That is, E(t) increases as A(t) decreases.
Stage II: The second stage is with ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 1) ; where technological
progress takes place only for the lagging country. Only B(t) decreases over time. Global
emissions in this case can be calculated as
E(t) =
A(t)L
2
 e2A(t) as 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) < 1"L(1+A(t)) : (17)
While the leading country generates a constant amount of pollution, the lagging country
reduces all of its pollution emissions. Therefore, it is clear that global pollution is kept
constant. That is, E(t) never changes while B(t) decreases over time.
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A fundamental question is whether global pollution rises or declines in the period
of regime switching from stages I to II. The answer is not clear and global pollution
depends on the extent of technological progress that takes place within that period.
Suppose that regime switching from stages I to II occurs from periods t to t + 1. If the
extent of technological progress in the leading country, i.e., A(t); is reasonably large,
global pollution is be reduced with this regime switching, E(t+ 1) < E(t).15
Stage III: In a more advanced stage of environmental technology development with
( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; pB(t)) ; as in stage II, only B(t) decreases over time. We can obtain
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + B(t))
 e3A(t) as A(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) + B(t) ; (18)
global emissions start to increase again. In a regime switch from stages II to III, global
pollution necessarily increases.16
Stage IV: Finally, if both countries have a su¢ ciently clean technology such that if
A(t) + B(t) <
1
"L(1+B(t))
, they do not need pollution reduction; ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) :
In this case, global pollution is given by
E(t) =
(A(t) + B(t))L
2
 e4(t) as A(t) + B(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) : (19)
This implies that global pollution emissions become constant in the long-run steady state
(i.e., in stage IV), given that A(t) and B(t) are constant due to ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) :
In a regime switch from stages III to IV, using a simple numerical example, we can show
that global emissions are reduced if technological progress for the lagging country, B(t);
is reasonably large.
We have shown the following proposition from the above analysis.
Proposition 2 (Global Pollution Dynamics) The global pollution E(t) may uctu-
ate over time in the process of environmental technological progress but nally converges
to the constant level in the long-run steady state.
Proposition 2 shows that the level of global pollution emissions becomes constant in
the long-run. However, whether the long-run level of global pollution emissions is lower
than the initial level is not clear in general; it can be either higher or lower potentially.
We will think of two typical numerical examples;17 see Appendix C for details.
Figure 5 (a) illustrates the rst example (a).18 In this case, leapfrogging does not
take place, and global emissions uctuates and eventually increases up to the level higher
than the initial level. This implies that the level of global pollution E(t) may increase
over time, despite the fact that environmental technology monotonically advances in
both countries. The intuition behind the result is as follows. Changes in pollution can
be decomposed into two fundamental forces: scale and technique e¤ects. As shown in
15To verify this, consider a numerical example with L = 0:5 and " = 0:5: Assume (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 4:5) and (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Then, regime switching occurs from t to t + 1; noting
(16) and (17). Furthermore, E(t) = 0:36364 declines to E(t+ 1) = 0:25:
16Suppose that the world goes from stages II to III in periods t+ 1 to t+ 2: By (17) and (18), noting
A(t+ 1) = A(t+ 2) in stage II, we can easily verify E(t+ 1) < E(t+ 2).
17In both examples, we set " = L = 0:5 and take (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial state.
18We consider the following specic learning-by-doing function: (i(t); k(t)) = (2; 0:75) if 

i (t) >
k(t) > 0 and (2; 0) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with assumptions (a) and (b).
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Grossman and Krueger (1993), the scale e¤ect measures the increase in pollution that
would be generated if the economy was simply scaled up, holding all else constant; the
technique e¤ect captures reduction in pollution caused by a fall in emissions intensity,
holding all else constant. In our model, a higher pollution reduction rate in the early
stage of environmental technology development, accompanied by a larger amount of pol-
lution reduction, induces rapid technological progress (through learning by doing), which
reduces pollution (the technique e¤ect). As technological progress enables a country to
save labor input used for abatement activity, more labor can be employed in production
of the good. This causes an increase in pollution (the scale e¤ect). Example (a) sug-
gests that the scale e¤ect in some cases may play a dominant role, where environmental
technology advances, but emissions also increase.19
Figure 5 (b) describes the second example (b).20 In this example, leapfrogging takes
place twice, where global pollution uctuates at rst, but nally declines to the lowest
level. This implies that the long-run amount of global pollution can be lower than the
initial amount in the case where leapfrogging takes place. This is essentially because, in
our model, the technology in the lagging country advances more rapidly than that in the
leading country as a result of the policy game with international strategic interactions.
Technologies in the two countries advance considerably and similarly if both countries
experience the state of a lagging country for more periods. This implies that techno-
logical progress may be more balanced between the two countries as leapfrogging occurs
more frequently. In that sense, environmental leapfrogging may lead to more balanced
technological progress in the world, thereby reducing global pollution in the long run.
Remark 3 The long-run level of global pollution emissions can be either lower or higher
than the initial level. In equilibrium where environmental leapfrogging occurs (does not
occur), the long-run global pollution emissions may tend to be lower (higher) than their
initial level.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that our analysis could explain the underlying cause
of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). The EKC is a hypothesized inverted U-
shaped relation between environmental quality and economic development.21 In our
model, production will increase over time because environmental technology advances
through learning-by-doing e¤ects. Our results shown in Figure 5 suggest that there is
an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and time (or economic growth) if
environmental leapfrogging occurs frequently. That is, balanced technological progress
between countries could be a key factor for the EKC relationship in the world economy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed a simple two-country model with global pollution and
endogenous technological progress induced by learning by doing. We characterized the
19Given that the scale e¤ect dominates, an increase in global pollution over time implies that production
increases over time. We can easily verify that in terms of utility, the increase in the output dominates
the increase in pollution. As environmental technology improves, utility increases over time. This would
suggest an important role for a nice balance of production (economic growth) and the environment.
20We consider the following learning-by-doing function: (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) > 0
and (1; 0) if i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with assumptions (a) and (b).
21See, for example, Dinda (2004) and Stern (2004) for a survey based on the EKC hypothesis.
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structure of equilibria and the dynamic environmental policies that achieve technological
progress or leapfrogging. Long-term global emissions and the dynamic path of environ-
mental friendliness are related to the initial environmental friendliness, environmental
awareness, and learning process between countries. Our ndings underscore the impor-
tance of considering the implications of technological progress in a multicountry frame-
work.
The important implications of our results are as follows. (i) Leapfrogging may occur
under reasonable conditions. Countries are likely to possess similar clean technologies in
the long run when leapfrogging occurs frequently. (ii) A country that has a large amount
of e¤ective labor and/or considerable environmental awareness tends to be an environ-
mental leader in the long run. (iii) Imbalanced adoption of new clean technologies among
countries is not always good for the environment. Global emissions can be mitigated by
controlling technological change to be uniform between countries. This needs to have
international coordination such as technology transfers and capacity building.
We have built a simple general equilibrium model to shed some light on the issue of
development and adoption of new clean technologies to control global emissions. It is
certainly worthwhile to build alternative models to more deeply understand the mecha-
nism underlying international di¤erences in technological progress. The following are in
particular worth mentioning and have been left for future research. First, our analysis
does not consider dynamic optimization because we treat pollution as a ow to derive
clear-cut results. However, it is interesting to investigate the issue when pollution is a
stock variable. Second, technological progress might be reinforced if the national gov-
ernment considers not only negative externalities caused by pollution, but also positive
externalities of learning-by-doing. Third, the channel for knowledge growth could be
by R&D investments as well as learning by doing. Last, there is no terms-of-trade ef-
fect because we have used a one-good model. Environmental regulations are a¤ected by
terms-of-trade e¤ects, which could change the long-term pace of technological progress.
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Appendix A
Wewill show the derivations for (9). Assume i(t) > j(t): By substituting ( i (t); 

i (t)) =
(ei(t); 0) and ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (1; ej(t)) into (6) and (7), we have
ei(t) =
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  "Lj(t)

"L+

1
1+i(t)
  "Lj(t)
 (A1)
and
ej(t) =
"L  1
j(t)
1
1+j(t)
"L+ 1
1+j(t)
; (A2)
respectively. With (A1) and (A2), noting 0  ei(t)  1 and 0  ej(t)  1 would imply
(9), given the denitions of pi(t) and qi(t):
Appendix B
We will show the derivations for Figure 4 (the case with heterogeneous countries).
The reaction function becomes
 i (t; 

j(t)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "i  11+i(t)

i(t)Li +
j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
Lj
 1
ei(t) otherwise
1 if "i  11+i(t)

j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
Lj
 1 ; (B1)
where
ei(t) =
"iLi   1i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"iLj

"iLi +

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"iLj
 : (B2)
Dene ^i such that ^i  1"iLi(1+^i) : Then, using (B1) and (B2), the equilibrium policy
pair goes to
( i (t); 

j(t)) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(0; 0) if A(t)LA + B(t)LB  mini2fA;Bg
n
1
"i(1+i(t))
o
(pi(t); 0) if
min
n
"i
"j

i(t) +
"i "j
"i

; 1
"iLj(1+i(t))
o
> j(t)  1"iLj(1+i(t))   i(t)LiLj
(1; 0) if ^j > j(t) > 1"iLj(1+i(t))
(1; qj(t)) if "i"j

i(t) +
"i "j
"i

> j(t)  ^j
; (B3)
where
pi(t) =
"iLi  1i(t)

1
1+i(t)
 j(t)"iLj

"iLi+

1
1+i(t)
 j(t)"iLj
 and qi(t) = "iLi  1i(t) 11+i(t)"iLi+ 11+i(t) : (B4)
It is straightforward to illustrate Figure 4 by using the above equilibrium conditions.
Appendix C
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We will explain numerical calculations for Remark 3 in detail. In both examples,
we think of (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial point, which ensures stage I
for country A as a leading country, noting (16). Set " = L = 0:5: Then, we calculate
E(t  1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571:
Example (a): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (2; 0:75) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 with (2; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
As (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) ; the world is in stage I by (16), and E(t  
1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571: Given the values of i(t) assumed, it goes to (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 5:5) : By (16), the world is also in stage I and we have E(t) = 1
1+1:75
' 0:36364:
In the subsequent period t+ 1; it becomes (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Noting (17),
the world shifts to stage II in period t + 1: We can calculate E(t + 1) = 0:25: Next,
(A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1; 1:5) satises the inequality condition in (18), so it is in stage
III and E(t+ 2) = 1
1+1:5
= 0:4: Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 3); B(t+ 3)) = (1; 0:5) ; which
satises (19). In period t + 3; the world moves to the terminal stage IV and we can
calculate E(t+3) = 1:5
4
= 0:375;which is higher than the initial level E(t  1) ' 0:28571:
Example (b): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 and (1; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
Through the assumed process of technological progress, stage I continues in pe-
riods t to t + 2: (A(t); B(t)) = (2:2; 6:5) ; (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1:9; 5:5) ; and
(A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1:6; 4:5) while E(t) = 11+2:2 ' 0:3125; E(t + 1) = 11+1:9 '
0:34483; and E(t + 2) = 1
1+1:6
' 0:38462: In periods t + 3 and t + 4; it goes to (1:3; 3:5)
and then (1:3; 2:5) ; in which case the world is in stage II noting (17). Then, E(t+ 3) =
E(t + 4) = 1:3
4
= 0:325: Next, (A(t+ 5); B(t+ 5)) = (1:3; 1:5) ; which satises (18). It
is stage III and E(t + 5) = 1
1+1:5
= 0:4: In period t + 6; it goes to (1:3; 0:5) ; in which
leapfrogging occurs and country B is a new leading country. An analogous inequality to
that in (18), B(t) < 1"L(1+A(t)) < A(t) + B(t); is satised, so that the world is in stage
III, E(t + 6) = 1
1+1:3
= 0:43478: Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 7); B(t+ 7)) = (0:3; 0:5); in
which leapfrogging occurs again. Country A regains the leadership and it satises (19),
stage IV. Then, we calculate E(t + 7) = 0:8
4
= 0:2; which is lower than the initial level
E(t  1) ' 0:28571
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